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ABSTRACT An innovative cross-layer authentication protocol that integrates cryptography-based authen-
tication and physical layer authentication (PLA) is proposed for massive cellular Internet of things (IoT)
systems. Due to dramatic increases in the number of cellular IoT devices, a centralized authentication
architecture in which a mobility management entity in core networks administers authentication of massive
numbers of IoT devices may cause network congestion with large signaling overhead. Thus, a distributed
authentication architecture in which a base station in radio access networks authenticates IoT devices
locally is presented. In addition, a cross-layer authentication protocol is designed with a novel integration
strategy under the distributed authentication architecture, where PLA, which employs physical features
for authentication, is used as preemptive authentication in the proposed protocol. Theoretical analysis
and numerical simulations were performed to analyze the trade-off between authentication performance
and overhead in the proposed authentication method compared with existing authentication protocols. The
results demonstrate that the proposed protocol outperforms conventional authentication and key agreement
protocols in terms of overhead and computational complexity while guaranteeing low authentication error
probability.
INDEX TERMS Authentication and key agreement, internet of things, physical layer authentication.
I. INTRODUCTION
With massive communication capacity and connectivity,
the fifth-generation (5G) mobile network technology is con-
sidered the key enabler of the fourth industrial revolution [1].
However, despite the remarkable advances, security remains
a serious problem [2], [3]. In particular, it has various security
vulnerabilities, for example, due to the potential massive
scale of connectivity and, limited hardware resources of IoT
devices. Furthermore, as cyber physical critical infrastructure
systems, e.g., smart grids have been deployed using 5G tech-
nology, ensuring security has become increasingly important.
In particular, spoofing attacks whereby untrusted users with
malicious intent attempt to masquerade as trusted users are a
major concern in cyber physical systems (CPSs) because such
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Chin-Feng Lai .
attacks can result in economic loss and cause the physical
infrastructure to become unstable.
Cryptographic authentication mechanisms have been stud-
ied and used to prevent spoofing attacks in cellular net-
works [4]–[15]. Instead of requiring a user password in
human-type communications (HTC), it is possible to con-
firm the identity of a device for machine-type communi-
cations (MTC) by using cryptography-based authentication
algorithms. An authentication and key agreement (AKA) pro-
tocol, which was standardized by the third generation partner-
ship project (3GPP) has been used in wireless networks. The
AKA protocol involves a challenge-response based authen-
tication mechanism that uses symmetric cryptography and
has been revised from the second-generation AKA proto-
col. Particularly, an evolved packet system AKA (EPS-AKA)
protocol has been widely used for mutual authentication
between a cellular network and a mobile device in long-term
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evolution (LTE) systems [16]. However, the EPS-AKA pro-
tocol suffers from traditional vulnerabilities (e.g., disclosure
of user identity) and attacks such as denial-of-service (DoS)
and replay attacks [17]. In addition, if a large number of IoT
devices attempt to access a network in a short period, high net-
work access latency and authentication signaling congestion
will occur. Therefore, it is necessary to develop lightweight
authentication protocols for the congestion avoidance in mas-
sive IoT systems.
Lightweight authentication protocols for massive IoT sys-
tems have been studied in [7]–[15], [18], [19]. In particular,
several research works focus on group-based authentication
for efficient authentication in massive networks [9]–[15].
In [9], a secure and efficient group AKA protocol named SE-
AKA is presented to offer not only efficient group authen-
tication but also a privacy enhancement of the international
mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) by using a public key
infrastructure (PKI). However, when a lot of MTC devices
are attached, this initial message can possibly congest the
network because the signaling between the mobility manage-
ment entity (MME) and the home subscriber server (HSS)
still contains information for every MTC devices in a group.
In [10], a group-based AKA (G-AKA) scheme has been
proposed to trust a group of IoT devices simultaneously and
generate a session key with each IoT device by adopting
the bilinear pairing technique and an aggregate signature
scheme in LTE networks. However, the G-AKA scheme has
high computational complexity which is impractical for low-
cost IoT devices. In [12], the elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman
(ECDH) protocol is used as a G-AKA protocol to protect
the session key and realize group authentication with strong
security.
Alternatively, physical layer authentication (PLA), which
enables fast and lightweight authentication by exploiting
physical characteristics (e.g., channel, and carrier frequency
offset (CFO)) for authentication, has attracted attention as an
authentication solution for IoT devices due to its efficiency
and effectiveness [20], [21]. PLA can be divided into two
cases, i.e., PLA without a shared PHY secret key and PLA
with a shared PHY secret key, according to the purpose of
the exploited physical layer (PHY) features. In PLA without
a shared PHY secret key, PHY features are used directly
as a secret key for authentication, whereas, in PLA with
a secret key, they are employed for the encryption of a
secret key shared between a pair of legitimate transceivers
for authentication. In PLA without a shared PHY secret
key, most PLA schemes make the best use of channel state
information (CSI) for authentication [22]–[25]. In the time
division duplex (TDD) mode, a channel can be easily shared
between legitimate transceivers due to channel reciprocity.
Except for that, other PHY features (e.g., CFO and hardware
imperfections) are used as a secret key for authentication
in [26]–[28]. These PLA schemes without a shared PHY
secret key do not require an additional secret key (i.e., key
management is not required). However, authentication per-
formance of the PLA can be directly related to characteristics
of PHY features because they play a role as a secret key. For
example, if a malicious IoT device is located near a legitimate
IoT device, a channel based PLA scheme cannot effectively
defend impersonation attacks of the malicious IoT device
because the channels depend on the transceiver’s location.
PLA methods with a secret key have been studied previ-
ously [29]–[32]. In suchmethods, PHY features are employed
to encrypt the secret key. While the PLA methods require a
shared PHY secret key, its authentication performance is less
sensitive to PHY features compared to PLA without a shared
PHY secret key. In [29], a unified approach to compression
and authentication of a signal is proposed to reduce compu-
tational complexity using a measurement matrix as a secret
key in compressive sensing (CS). In addition, PHY challenge-
response authentication mechanism (PHY-CRAM) schemes
have been studied extensively in [30]–[32]. In these meth-
ods [31], [32], a channel phase sensitive to the locations of
wireless transceivers is employed to encrypt a secret key
in the challenge-response stages. However, if PHY features,
which cannot be controlled, change rapidly, authentication
performance can be degraded. For example, if coherence time
is less than the authentication period, PHY-CRAM using CSI
may reject a legitimate response signal due to the changed
CSI. To avoid such authentication failures with the PHY
only features, cross-layer authentication schemes that inte-
grate PLA and cryptography-based authentication techniques
have been proposed in [33]–[38]. In [36], hardware experi-
ment for cross-layer authentication is performed to demon-
strate advantages of combining PLA and cryptography-
based authentication by using OpenAirInterface. In addition,
a novel cross-layer authentication scheme is presented to
ensure authentication performance stability under dynamic
communication scenarios in [37]. However, authentication
protocols that simply cascade both layer schemes might be
inefficient in terms of signaling overhead and have limited
practical applications.
In this article, we propose a cross-layer authentication
protocol that applies PLA to an EPS-AKA protocol in mas-
sive IoT systems. To reduce overhead and delay caused by
authentication of massive IoT devices, a distributed authen-
tication architecture in which a base station (BS) authenti-
cates of IoT devices in radio access networks (RANs) rather
than using a MME in core networks is employed in this
proposed protocol. In addition, PLA is used for distributed
authentication in the proposed protocol. However, the authen-
tication performance of PLA may be unsatisfactory in poor
communication environments (e.g., low signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR)); on the other hand, PLA schemes can provide small
signaling overhead and short delay time for authentication.
The proposed protocol can alleviate the authentication perfor-
mance degradation of PLA and reduce signaling overhead of
cryptography-based authentication by exploiting advantages
of both PLA and cryptography-based authentication using a
novel integration strategy. Through theoretical analysis and
numerical simulation, we demonstrate that an authentication
error probability can be set by determining two thresholds in
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the proposed protocol. In addition, the proposed protocol has
small signaling overhead and small computational complex-
ity compared to conventional AKA protocols.
The main contributions of this article are summarized as
follows:
• A cross-layer authentication protocol that integrates
PLA and a conventional AKA is proposed for massive
cellular IoT systems. The proposed protocol uses a novel
integration strategy based on the test statistic result of
PLA which is our previous work in [39]. In addition,
it is a generalized version of a cross-layer authentication
protocol in [39], where any PLA scheme can be applied
to the proposed protocol.
• To reduce signaling overhead in cellular networks, a dis-
tributed authentication architecture is presented for mas-
sive IoT devices in this article. In addition, we simply
categorize cellular IoT devices as follows: Class I, II and
III (please refer to Section II). The proposed protocol
targets authentication of Class III devices under the
distributed authentication architecture.
• For sophisticated cross-layer authentication, we propose
a novel integration strategy based on the test statistic
result of PLA. By using this integration strategy, a pro-
posed protocol can reduce the signaling overhead while
providing a competitive authentication performance.
• Through theoretical analysis and numerical simulation,
we analyze security, overhead, and complexity of the
proposed protocol. In case of overhead, signaling and
communication overheads of the proposed protocol are
derived. In addition, we show a trade-off relationship
between authentication performance and overhead in the
proposed protocol.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.
Section II presents the motivation of this work. The proposed
cross-layer authentication protocol is described in Section III.
In Section IV, we analyze the proposed protocol in terms
of security, overhead and complexity. The simulation results
to evaluate the performance of the proposed protocol are
presented in Section V. Finally, concluding remarks are given
in Section VI.
Notation: Upper-case and lower-case boldface letters are
used for matrices and vectors, respectively. CN (µ, σ 2) repre-
sents the distribution of circularly symmetric complex Gaus-
sian random variable with mean µ and variance σ 2.
II. MOTIVATION
5G is expected to enable ubiquitous connectivity, where mas-
sive devices to connected the network are used to realize
CPSs (i.e., the IoT). However, 5G technology involves several
security vulnerabilities that must be considered e.g., mas-
sive IoT devices, CPSs, and limited hardware capabilities.
In particular, it is prone to active attacks (e.g., DoS, imperson-
ation, man-in-the-middle attacks) due to the vulnerabilities.
For example, assume that the numbers of mobile and MTC
devices are 636, 000 and 6, 360, 000, respectively in 3GPP
scenario [40]. Then, if conventional EPS-AKA is used for
authentication in the scenario, the total signaling overhead for
all devices becomes about 1.6×1011 bits. The heavy signaling
burden implies a significant increase of the processing load
on the control plane entities of the network (e.g., MME) and
finally causes network congestion.
Heterogeneity of 5G that various kinds of devices attempt
to communicate with each other in 5G networks should be
considered for the design of an authentication protocol. For
example, some IoT devices, e.g., smart meters send very short
data packets in the networks. Then, conventional authentica-
tion mechanisms are inefficient for the IoT devices in terms
of overhead, although they are suitable for authentication of
devices that transmit streaming data (e.g., smartphone and
tablet). Thus, different authentication protocols should be
applied for each device type. In this article, we categorize
such devices as follows: Class I is for HTC devices such
as a mobilephone and Class II represents IoT devices with
sufficient hardware capabilities (e.g., industrial IoT device,
data concentrator unit). Class III represents massive IoT
devices with limited hardware capabilities (e.g., smart meter
and street lighting). Based on the device categorization, while
conventional centralized security architectures in which enti-
ties (e.g., MME andHSS) in core networks charge all security
in a centralized manner is appropriate for Class I and II
devices, it is not suitable for Class III devices due to signaling
inefficiency and limited hardware capabilities. It means that
the Class III devices need a new security architecture to
increase overhead efficiency and reduce computational com-
plexity. So, it is important to develop a streamlined authenti-
cation protocol for massive IoT systems.
Motivated by the problems, a new security framework
that imposes a burden of security (i.e., authentication) on
RANs in a distributed manner is presented in this article
(referred to as local security). As shown in Fig.1, a BS
in RANs independently authenticates Class III devices to
reduce excessive network traffic to the MME in the dis-
tributed authentication architecture. Based on the notion of
local security, cross-layer authentication, which combines
PLA with cryptography-based authentication, is employed as
a solution for Class III device authentication in this article.
This can reduce signaling overhead in core networks and the
computational complexity of low-cost IoT devices using a
PLA scheme in a cryptographic authentication mechanism.
Physical characteristics (e.g., channel, and CFO) can substi-
tute for the cryptographic algorithms (e.g., hash functions) in
PLA. As a result, authentication can be made more secure in
terms of information-theoretical security, while conventional
cryptography-based authentication aims for computational
security, which can be broken given sufficient computational
capacity. Despite the advantages of PLA, PLA may not guar-
antee robust authentication reliability due to feature varia-
tion and environmental factors such as noise. In particular,
it is frequent to authentication of Class III devices because
Class III devices have limited power capabilities (i.e., low
SNR). Therefore, a cross-layer authentication can be con-
sidered as a solution by taking both advantages of PLA
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FIGURE 1. Proposed authentication architecture based on local security in cellular networks.
and cryptography-based authentication. However, its design
has not been studied actively due to the independence of
PLA and cryptographic authentication. In particular, existing
cross-layer authentication schemes [33]–[35] do not consider
both signaling overhead and authentication performance and
there is no deep analysis for the performances of the cross-
layer authentication scheme. In [33], a cross-layer authen-
tication scheme is proposed to reduce delay in smart meter
systems, but it cannot provide authentication reliability com-
parable to a cryptography-based authentication. On the other
hand, cross-layer authentication protocols in [34], [35] cannot
reduce overhead and delay, while it can enhance authentica-
tion performance by cascading PLA and cryptography-based
authentication. Consequently, it is necessary to design a new
cross-layer protocol that applies PLA to the cryptography-
based authentication to reduce network traffic in massive IoT
while guaranteeing reasonable authentication performance.
III. PROPOSED CROSS-LAYER
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
In this section, we present the proposed cross-layer authen-
tication protocol, which integrates PLA and cryptography-
based authentication (i.e., AKA) for massive IoT systems.
A. INTEGRATION STRATEGY FOR
CROSS-LAYER AUTHENTICATION
In this subsection, we briefly introduce our previously pro-
posed integration strategy [39], which is implemented in
the proposed cross-layer authentication approach. The inte-
gration problem is a key issue in cross-layer authentication
because it can significantly affect authentication performance
and signaling overhead. We aim to design cross-layer authen-
tication for low-cost IoT devices to reduce signaling over-
head, and maintain reasonable authentication performance
under bad communication environments.
PLA enables fast and lightweight authentication with
small signaling overhead; however, PLA demonstrates lower
authentication performance than cryptography-based authen-
tication techniques. Thus, in the integration strategy [39],
a PLA scheme is employed as preemptive authentication
between an IoT device and the BS. After performing the PLA,
the need to perform cryptography-based authentication in the
proposed protocol is determined according to the preemptive
authentication result. Generally, the PLA result is based on
a test statistic, which is influenced by the communication
environment, e.g., channel and noise. Thus, it can cause an
error in authentication (i.e., binary hypothesis testing) at a
low probability in PLA. Therefore, it is important to define
a vague result of the test statistic.
As a result, the preemptive authentication result in the
proposed protocol is divided into three cases: ‘Rejected’,
‘Ambiguous’ and ‘Authenticated’, while conventional PLA
only determines whether a received signal is legitimate or an
intrusion signal. In ‘Rejected’ and ‘Authenticated’, the BS
can be sure about whether the received signal is from an
intruder or a legitimate IoT device, respectively, with a
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high probability. On the other hand, in ‘Ambiguous’, the BS
is not sure about whether or not the signal is legitimate.
That is, we stipulate that ‘Ambiguous’ is an ambiguous result
that is difficult to determine whether it is ‘Rejected’ or
‘Authenticated’ in the physical layer, which is processed by
the upper layer cryptography-based authentication. This is
a key point in the integration strategy. Then, to determine
a preemptive result among the three cases (i.e., ‘Rejected’,
‘Ambiguous’ and ‘Authenticated’) in PLA, two thresholds
denoted α0 and α1 are used in PLA, while a conventional
PLA method employs a threshold to differentiate ‘Rejected’
and ‘Authenticated’ cases. Here, for given target miss and
false alarm probabilities (denoted P◦M and P
◦
F , respectively),
the thresholds are determined as follows:
α1 = argmax
α






(1− Fη|H0 (α)) ≤ P
◦
F , (2)
whereFη|Hi (x) is the cumulative distribution function of η|Hi
for i = 0, 1. Here, η is a test statistic for authentication deci-
sion and H1 and H0 are the alternative hypothesis, i.e., the
received signal is transmitted by a legitimate IoT device and
the null hypothesis, i.e., the received signal is transmitted by
an intrusion device, respectively.
For easy comprehension, suppose a channel based PLA
using a test statistic of η = corr(HA,HU ) for an authenti-
cation decision, where HA and HU denote the stored channel
matrix used as a secret key and the estimated channel matrix
from a received signal, respectively. In addition, corr(x, y) is
the correlation coefficient between x and y. Then, as shown
in Fig.2, although distributions of η for legitimate and intru-
sion signals are different, they can be slightly close due to
bad communication environment (e.g., SNR), and it results
a poor authentication performance. So, as mentioned earlier,
in the proposed integration strategy, areas for the three cases
are determined with α0 and α1 as follows:
2 =

Rejected if η ≤ α1
Ambiguous if α1 ≤ η ≤ α0
Authenticated if η ≥ α0.
(3)
Thus, if the preemptive result is ‘Authenticated’ or ‘Rejected’,
authentication is complete (i.e., cryptography-based authen-
tication is not performed). On the other hand, if the
result is ‘Ambiguous’, cryptography-based authentication
is performed to make a final authentication decision at
the MME.
B. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this subsection, we propose a cross-layer authentication
protocol that prevents severe network congestion in core
networks and minimize the computational complexity for
authentication for low-cost IoT devices in massive IoT sys-
tems. To this end, the notion of local security is investi-
gated, and a PLA scheme is applied to a EPS-AKA protocol
FIGURE 2. Probability density functions of the test statistic, η by
legitimate and intrusion signals.
(i.e., LTE model) with the aforementioned integration strat-
egy. Thus, advanced encryption standard (AES), one of
the EPS algorithms, is used for encryption and decryption
functions in the proposed protocol. In addition, secret keys
(i.e., cipher key and integrity key) for cryptography-based
security are the same as the conventional EPS-AKA. It is
also assumed that both numbers of rounds for PLA and
cryptography-based authentication are set to one because
we aim to demonstrate the effectiveness of PLA and how
to integrate PLA with AKA. Then, a BS plays a crucial
role in authenticating an IoT device through a PLA scheme,
which further alleviates traffic loads in core networks in
the proposed protocol. In PLA, PHY features are exploited
to substitute for a secret key or encrypt the secret key for
authentication. Then, according to the goal of PHY features
in PLA, the proposed protocol is divided into two cases,
i.e., 1) without a shared PHY secret key, 2) with a shared PHY
secret key.
1) WITHOUT A SHARED PHY SECRET KEY
In this case, PLA without a secret key is applied to a conven-
tional AKA protocol. Thus, the proposed protocol has no use
for a PHY secret key; however, it is necessary to register PHY
features (e.g., channel, CFO, . . . ) as a PHY secret key during
initial authentication. Here, cryptography-based authentica-
tion should be performed for the initial authentication. If suc-
cessful, PHY features are then estimated and registered by
transmitting a pilot signal. Next, based on the shared feature,
a PLA scheme is used for preemptive authentication for the
subsequent authentications. The flow of the proposed proto-
col is shown in Fig. 3. As can be seen, 11messages are divided
among three steps: i) initial attach (M (1)1 ∼ M
(1)
2 ), ii) key
generation and distribution (M (1)3 )), and iii) authentication
(M (1)4 ∼ M
(1)
11 ) messages are exchanged in the proposed
protocol as follows.
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FIGURE 3. Proposed cross-layer authentication protocol without a shared PHY secret key.
• M (1)1 : The IoT device sends the IMSI from the universal
subscriber identity module (USIM) card of the device
for user identification.
• M (1)2 : The MME requests authentication data to the
HSS by forwarding user identification and network
information.
• M (1)3 : The HSS generates authentication vectors (AVs)
and transmits them to the MME.
• M (1)4 : For the initial authentication, the MME selects an
AV, retrieves RAND and AUTN, and sends them to the
IoT device.
• M (1)5 : The IoT device authenticates the networks and
transmits a pilot signal to extract PHY features for PLA.
• M (1)6 : For the initial authentication of the IoT device,
the IoT device transmits RES to the MME.
• M (1)7 : The MME authenticates the IoT device and trans-
mits a pilot signal to extract PHY features for PLA.
• M (1)8 : For the subsequent authentication, the BS trans-
mits a pilot signal for the authentication using a PLA
scheme.
• M (1)9 : For the subsequent authentication, the IoT trans-
mits a pilot signal for the authentication using a PLA
scheme.
• M (1)10 : If the PLA result is ‘Ambiguous’, theMME selects
an unused AV, retrieves RAND and AUTN, and sends
them to the IoT device.
• M (1)11 : If the PLA result is ‘Ambiguous’, the IoT device
authenticates the networks and transmits RES to the
MME.
Note that the initial authentication procedures differ from
those of the subsequent authentications. As mentioned previ-
ously, for authentication, PHY features should be extracted
in the first authentication process. In addition, AVs for
cryptography-based authentication should be generated and
distributed in the initial authentication. Then, procedures
(M (1)1 ∼ M
(1)
7 ) are performed for the initial authentication.
Furthermore, the registered PHY features at the BS and
stored AVs at the MME are used in the subsequent authen-




11 ) are per-
formed in the subsequent authentication. This process deter-
mines cryptography-based authentication procedures (M9
and M10) are required according to the preemptive authen-
tication result.
2) WITH A SHARED PHY SECRET KEY
In this case, a PLA scheme with a secret key is used as pre-
emptive authentication in cross-layer authentication. Here,
it is assumed that a PHY secret key is generated and shared
to both the HSS and IoT device using the USIM card. Then,
unlike the previous case, a PHY feature is used to encrypt the
PHY secret key rather than extract the PHY secret key. Thus,
from the HSS, the PHY secret key should be distributed to the
BS. Then, as shown in Fig. 4, the proposed protocol proceeds
as follows.
• M (2)1 : Same asM
(1)
1 .
• M (2)2 : Same asM
(1)
2 .
• M (2)3 : The HSS generates AVs that include a PHY secret
key for PLA and transmits them to the MME.
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FIGURE 4. Proposed cross-layer authentication protocol with a shared PHY secret key.
• M (2)4 : The MME forwards the secret key for the PLA to
the BS and retains the other authentication information
for cryptographic challenge-response authentication.
• M (2)5 : For authentication of the IoT device, the BS trans-
mits a pilot (i.e., challenge) signal to the IoT device.
• M (2)6 : The IoT device sends the BS a PHY-response
signal with the PHY secret key which is encapsulated
with the estimated PHY features.
• M (2)7 : For authentication of the network, the IoT device
transmits a pilot (i.e., challenge) signal to the BS.
• M (2)8 : The BS sends the IoT device a PHY-response
signal with the PHY secret key which is encapsulated
with the estimated PHY features.
• M (2)9 : Same asM
(1)
10 .
• M (2)10 : Same asM
(1)
11 .
In this case, for initial authentication, all 10 messages for
the three steps are exchanged, whereas seven messages
are exchanged for the user identification and authentication




10 ) for the subsequent
authentication.
The main difference between the two cases is whether
PHY secret key generation and distribution are performed
or PHY features are extracted in place of a PHY secret
key. Thus, the second case, i.e., with a shared PHY secret
key, incurs more signaling overhead than the first case (i.e.,
without a shared PHY secret key). However, generally, a PLA
scheme with a shared PHY secret key (e.g., PHY-CRAM)
has better authentication performance than a PLA scheme
without a shared PHY secret key. There are two main reasons
why the first case shows limited authentication performance
improvement over the second case. First, PLA without a
shared PHY secret key is more sensitive to communication
environment (e.g., noise and interference) because it directly
uses physical features (e.g., channel) as a secret key, while
PLAwith a shared PHY secret key uses the features to encrypt
a shared PHY secret key. Thus, the first case is less secure
under poor communication environments. Secondly, if the
physical features changes rapidly, the first approach can lead
to poor authentication performance when the shared PHY
secret key is not updated along the channel variations. On the
other hand, the second case is less susceptible to channel
changes as it uses the instantaneous physical key obtained
from the channel when used. For those reasons, PLA without
a shared PHY secret key version of the proposed protocol is
more suitable for controlled or static environments with less
resources. Therefore, two proposed cases can be selectively
applied according to the communication scenarios and chan-
nel conditions of a wide range of applications in IoT.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, the proposed protocol is analyzed theoretically
in terms of security, overhead, and complexity in massive
IoT systems.
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The lightweight protocol targets low-cost IoT devices with
limited hardware resources; however, it needs to provide
reasonable security performance because IoT devices can be
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used in CPSs. The proposed cross-layer authentication pro-
tocol enhances security against various attacks by exploiting
the advantages of both PLA and cryptography-based authen-
tication.
1) EAVESDROPPING ATTACKS
An intruder may try to get a shared PHY secret key via
eavesdropping attacks. It is necessary to analyze a formal
verification of the proposed protocol against the eavesdrop-
ping attacks. However, since this study presents a general-
ized version of cross-layer authentication without specific
security algorithms (e.g. PLA technology and cryptographic
algorithms), we cannot strictly verify the security function of
the proposed protocol. For formal verification, it is necessary
to specify the PLA technique used in the proposed proto-
col, so for analysis, assume that the proposed protocol uses
the PHY-CRAM technique [31]. Then, the response signal







cos (2π fit + ϕi −1θ̂i,1), (4)
where ϕi =
1−κi
2 π and1θ̂i,1 is the phase differences between
the first and the i-th subcarriers. Here, κi is the i-th bit of
the secret key. Then, assuming that the intruder IoT device
is more than half a wavelength away from the legitimate
IoT device and BS, the information-theoretic security of the
proposed protocol in an independent fading channel can be
verified. Let θi and θ̃i denote the i-th channel phases of the
legitimate IoT device and the intruder, respectively, and θ =
θi+θ̃i mod 2π . In addition, fθi (x), fθ̃i (x), and fθ (x) denote the
probability density functions (PDFs) of θi, θ̃i, and θ , respec-
tively. Then, fθi =
1
2π and fθ̃i =
1
2π , due to Rayleigh fading
channels. Thus, since θi and θ̃i are independent, the PDF of θ








It means that θ̃i and θ are independent and identically dis-
tributed [34]. Then, by monitoring the response signal from
the legitimate IoT device, the received signal at the side of an




|gi| cos (2π fit + ϕi + θ1 − (θ̃i − θi)), (6)
where gi is the i-th channel coefficient of the intruder. Accord-
ingly, since θ̃i − θi cannot be estimated and is random over
(−π, π], the mutual information between the received signal
and the secret key is given by
I (z; κ) = 0, (7)
where I (x;y) is the mutual information which is a measure
of the mutual dependence between x and y. Therefore, it is
verified that there is no hope for the intruder to extract any
reliable information about the secret key. It means that infor-
mation theoretic security can be perfectly ensured under the
independent Rayleigh fading channel environment.
2) IMPERSONATION ATTACKS
For impersonation attacks, it is assumed that an intrusion
IoT device knows which PLA scheme used in the proposed
protocol. However, the intrusion device does not know the
shared PHY secret key (i.e., κ) and cannot estimate the PHY
features used for authentication. As a result, an arbitrary
secret key κE and its own PHY features are employed for
impersonation attacks. Under these conditions, the intrusion
IoT device attempts to impersonate a legitimate IoT device.
For impersonation attacks, the proposed protocol provides
significantly improved authentication reliability compared to
conventional PLA. Generally, the miss and false alarm prob-
abilities (denoted PM and PF , respectively) are considered to
represent the authentication performance of PLA in imper-
sonation attacks. Here, PM is the probability that the BS will
identify the signal as an intrusion signal when a legitimate
IoT device transmits, and PF is the probability that the BS
will identify the signal as legitimate when an intrusion device
transmits. In conventional PLA, the authentication decision
is determined using binary hypothesis testing based on the
test statistic η. In detail, using different distributions of η for
the hypotheses (i.e., fη|H1 (x) and fη|H0 (x)), the BS determines
whether the received signal is legitimate or an intrusion with a
certain threshold in conventional PLA. Therefore, the differ-
ences of the distributions (e.g., Kullback–Leibler (KL) diver-
gence and the difference of cumulative distribution functions
(CDFs)) are crucial factors representing PLA performance,
where a PLA scheme with large distance between distribu-
tions can provide good authentication performance. However,
the differences become small in poor communication envi-
ronments (e.g., environments with significant noise and fad-
ing, limited hardware capabilities of an IoT device) regardless
of the applied PLA scheme. Thus, the authentication perfor-
mance of conventional PLA depends on the communication
environment, which is an uncontrollable factor. Furthermore,
the PHY features of an intrusion IoT device may be similar
to those of a legitimate IoT device; however, even under poor
conditions, the proposed cross-layer authentication protocol
can provide good authentication performance by integrating
PLA and cryptography-based authentication. Unlike the sin-
gle threshold of conventional PLA, here, two thresholds are
used to divide the three result cases in the proposed protocol,
i.e., ‘Rejected’, ‘Ambiguous’ and ‘Authenticated’. Note that
as mentioned earlier, the two thresholds are determined with
target miss and false alarm probabilities (i.e., P◦M and P
◦
F ).
Then, we can control the authentication performance withP◦M




F values are too small, large
signaling overhead can be incurred (Section IV.B).
3) SIGNAL REPLAY ATTACKS
For signal replay attacks, an intrusion IoT device first
eavesdrops on an IMSI and authentication signal for PLA
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(e.g., M (1)9 and M
(2)
6 ), and then attempts to cheat the BS
by replaying the identical signal. Here, it is assumed that
the intrusion IoT device has sufficient hardware resources.
While conventional cryptography-based authentication is dif-
ficult in depending on the replay attack, PLA can prevent
such attacks using unclonable PHY features (e.g., channel
and CFO). First, in a PLA scheme without a shared PHY
secret key, a pilot signal (i.e., M (1)9 ) is transmitted from a
legitimate IoT device to estimate the PHY features used
for authentication. Then, the intrusion IoT device can easily
detect the pilot signal but cannot estimate the PHY features,
which are unique due to hardware imperfections and the
RF environment, which means that replaying the signal will
have no effect. In a PLA scheme with a shared PHY secret
key, a response signal (i.e., M (2)6 ) is transmitted from the
legitimate IoT device for authentication. Thus, it is difficult
for intrusion IoT device to decode the response signal because
the signal is encrypted using PHY features. For example,
in PHY-CRAM [31], channel phases are used to encrypt a
response signal. As a result, the intrusion IoT device cannot
extract reliable information about κ due to the uniqueness
of the channel phase. In addition, if the intrusion IoT device
replays the received response signal, the BS can discriminate
the replayed signal because it is transmitted over a different
channel. However, although the intrusion IoT device cannot
perfectly estimate and compensate the PHY features, it may
compensate some PHY features using intelligent behaviors,
e.g., if the intrusion IoT device moves closer to the legit-
imate IoT device or BS to compensate channels used for
authentication. If partial PHY features estimated by the intru-
sion IoT device are used for replay attacks, the distribu-
tions of test statistic (i.e., fη|H1 (x) and fη|H0 (x)) get closer.
In this case, PLA is vulnerable to replay attacks. In con-
trast, the proposed protocol is resilient against replay attacks
with PHY feature compensation due to the guard interval
(i.e., ‘Ambiguous’) of the proposed integration strategy. Here,
there is a high probability that a replayed signal will be
included in ‘Ambiguous’ under PHY feature compensation.
Therefore, the signal can be detected via cryptography-based
authentication.
4) BRUTE-FORCE ATTACKS
Assuming the intrusion IoT device knows the cryptography-
based authentication algorithm, significant effort may be
required to extract a secret key used for the algorithm.
The existing cryptography-based protocols [9], [11], [14]
depend on the computational hardness of encryption algo-
rithms. They can be broken if an intruder has enough com-
putational time and resources. On the other hand, the pro-
posed protocol has not only the computational hardness
of cryptography-based authentication but also information-
theoretic security induced by PLA. In particular, as physical
features (e.g., channel) used for PLA have high indepen-
dence and randomness each other, the intruder cannot get
any information for a secret key although it has enough
computational time and resources. In addition, many samples
are needed for the cryptography-based authentication signal
(e.g.,M (1)11 andM
(21)
10 ). In the proposed protocol, it is difficult
for the intrusion IoT device to obtain authentication sam-
ples because cryptography-based authentication is performed
selectively with low probability (Section IV.B), which means
that the proposed protocol is secure against other intelligent
attacks (e.g., replay and DoS attacks) for cryptography-based
authentication.
5) TRACEABILITY ATTACKS
The proposed protocol is vulnerable to a traceability attack
since it is designed by integrating PLA with EPS-AKA.
However, PLA can be applied to other AKA protocols such as
SE-AKA, G-AKA, etc. For example, if a cross-layer authen-
tication protocol integrates PLA with SE-AKA, it can resist
the traceability attacks. The traceability attacks are beyond
the scope of this study, of which goal is to demonstrate the
effectiveness of applying PLA to an AKA protocol by pre-
senting a generalized version of a cross-layer authentication
with EPS-AKA.
B. OVERHEAD ANALYSIS
In this subsection, the proposed protocol is analyzed and
compared to the conventional EPS-AKA protocol in terms
of signaling and communication overheads. As discussed
previously, the thresholds (i.e., α1 and α0) are determined
with P◦M and P
◦
F , respectively. For convenience, it is assumed
that fη|H1 (x) is biased to the right of fη|H0 (x), as shown
in Fig. 2. Then, from (3), lower target miss and false alarm
probabilities will result in greater distances between α1 and
α0 which determines the range of ‘Ambiguous’. Here, λ
denotes a probability of ‘Ambiguous’ (i.e., p (α1 ≤ η ≤ α0));
thus, the probability, λ, is given by
λ = ρ
(

































where ρ is a weighting factor and 1(α) = Fη|H0 (α) −
Fη|H1 (α). Here,1(α) is the difference of the cumulative den-
sity functions and represents a measure of PLA performance.
Then, from (8), as 1(α), P◦M , and P
◦
F increase, low λ values
can be obtained in the proposed protocol. This means that, if a
PLA scheme integrated with cryptography-based authentica-
tion provides good authentication performance, low λ values
can be obtained, which produces a small signaling overhead.
The relationship between λ and overhead is summarized as
follows:
1) SIGNALING OVERHEAD
In [13], the signaling overhead of EPS-AKA is given by
EPS−AKA = N (704+ 608U + 528(P− 1)), (9)
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TABLE 1. Parameters.
where N and U are the number of IoT devices and the
number of authentication vectors, respectively. In addi-
tion, P denotes the number of authentication trials per IoT
device.
As shown in Fig. 3, the tenth and the eleventh messages
associated with the cryptography-based authentication are
exchanged with a probability of λ̃ = 1 − (1 − λ)2 for
the mutual authentication in the proposed protocol without a
shared PHY secret key. Then, the average signaling overhead










|M (1)1 | + 9∑
p=8













where M (1)i is the i-th message in the proposed protocol
without a shared PHY secret key, and V is the length of the
pilot sequence. Based on the related parameters in TABLE 1,
|M (1)1 | = |M
(1)
2 | = 176, |M
(1)
3 | = 608U , |M
(1)
4 | = 288
|M (1)5 | = L, |M
(1)
6 | = 64, |M
(1)
7 | = |M
(1)
8 | = |M
(1)
9 | = L,
|M (1)10 | = 288, and |M
(1)
11 | = 64. Similarly, as shown in Fig. 4,
the average signaling overhead for the proposed protocol with
FIGURE 5. Communication costs.











|M (2)1 | + 8∑
p=5











176+ 4L + 352λ̃
))
, (11)
whereM (2)i is the i-th message in the proposed protocol with
a shared PHY secret key, and L is the length of the PHY secret
key. In addition, |M (2)1 | = |M
(2)
2 | = 176, |M
(2)
3 | = 608U +L,
|M (2)4 | = |M
(2)
5 | = |M
(2)
6 | = |M
(2)
7 | = |M
(2)
8 | = L,
|M (2)9 | = 288, and |M
(2)
10 | = 64.
The signaling overheads of the proposed protocol depend
on L, V and λ determined by P◦M , P
◦
F , 1(α0), and 1(α1).
Then, the signaling overheads in the proposed protocol are








, with a PHY secret key. (12)
Then, from (8), when ρ = 0.5, to obtain a small signal-
ing overhead, the PLA scheme for the proposed cross-layer
authentication protocol should satisfy the following:
1(α0)+1(α1)
2







Here, λ◦ denotes a target probability satisfying (12). This
means that the signaling overhead in the proposed protocol is
affected by own authentication performance of a PLA scheme
and target authentication performance.
2) COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
According to a communication link, the required burden dif-
fers for transmission because communication resources (e.g.,
bandwidth) vary. Here, communication overhead that con-
siders communication cost is more practical than signaling
overhead. As shown in Fig. 5, a, b, and c denote cost units
incurred by delivering an authentication packet between an
IoT device and the BS, between the BS and the MME, and
between the MME and HSS, respectively. Then, the commu-
nication overhead in EPS-AKA is given by
3EPS−AKA = N (495P(a+ b)+ c(176+ 608U )) . (14)
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Here, a+b is the communication cost between the IoT device
and the MME. On the other hand, communication overheads
in the proposed protocols without and with the PHY secret
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= N (a(176+ 4L + 352λ̃)+ b(176+ L + 352λ̃)
+ c(176+ 608U + L)+ (P− 1)(a(176+ 4L + 352λ̃)
+ b(176+ 352λ̃))). (16)
From (14) and (15), the communication overhead of the
proposed protocol without a shared PHY secret key is less
than that of EPS-AKA when
1A,1a > 1B,1b, (17)
where 1A,1 = 352(P − 1)(1 − λ̃) − 2PV and 1B,1 =
352(P − 1)(λ̃ − 1). Then, for any c, the proposed protocol
without a shared PHY secret key and the EPS-AKA are
affected equally. Furthermore, a large b value is favorable
in the proposed protocol without a shared PHY secret key
because 1B,1 < 0. In addition, if V < −
1B,1
2P , the proposed
protocol without a shared PHY secret key always has less
communication overhead than EPS-AKA regardless of the
cost units (i.e., a and b).
TABLE 2. Time cost parameters.
In the same manner, from (14) and (16), if L < (1−λ̃)3524 ,
the communication overhead in the proposed protocol with a
shared PHY secret key is less than that of EPS-AKA when

















From our analyses, we found that the proposed protocol
without a shared PHY secret key demonstrates better perfor-
mance than the method with a shared PHY secret key in terms
of communication overhead if L = V .
C. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
In this subsection, the computational complexity of the pro-
posed protocol is analyzed. The time used for primitive opera-
tions was measured using the C/C++ OPENSSL library [41]
tested on a Celeron 1.1 GHz processor as a IoT device and
Dual-core 2.6 GHz CPU as an MME and HSS. Here, we set
the time cost parameters (TABLE 2) in reference to [42].
Unlike conventional cryptography-based schemes, a PLA
scheme requires extra computation using PHY features rather
than encryption algorithms (e.g., a hash algorithm). However,
the feature estimation (e.g., channel and CFO estimations)
is necessary for wireless communications (not for authenti-
cation). This means that extra estimation resources are not
required for authentication in the proposed protocol.
The mean of computation time of the proposed protocol is
calculated as follows:
E[9cross] = 5λN (TH−IoTD + TH−HSS ), (20)
where TH−IoTD and TH−HSS denote the hash time in IoT
device and in HSS, respectively. Then, the computation time
of the proposed protocol is very short due to the small λ
values. As shown in Table 3, the proposed protocol has very
short computation time compared to existing AKA protocols,
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FIGURE 6. False alarm probability for various |µ1 − µ0| and σ20 , where
σ21 = σ
2




where C denotes the number of groups for group-based AKA
algorithms.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation results to discuss the
performance of the proposed protocol in terms of authenti-
cation, overhead, and computational complexity. For these
simulations, we assumed that the distributions of η for legiti-
mate and intrusion signals follow Gaussian distributions with
means of µ0 andµ1 and variances of σ 20 and σ
2
1 , respectively.

















difference of two CDFs for legitimate and intrusion IoT
signals. Note that the difference of two CDFs represents the
authentication performance of a PLA scheme. Meanwhile,
units of signaling and communication overheads are bit.
In addition, it is assumed that a = 1/BWa, b = 1/BWb,
and c = 1/BWc, where BWa, BWb, and BWc denote the
bandwidths between IoT device and BS and between BS and
MME and betweenMME and HSS, respectively. Here, we set
BWa = 2 × 105 and BWb = BWc = 3.55 × 108 because
the RF bandwidth of NB-IoT is 200 kHz [43] and control
plane interfaces for connections between BS and MME and
between MME and HSS in NB-IoT require minimum band-
width of 0.355 GHz [44].
In Fig. 6, we show the false alarm probability for various








tioned previously, 1(α) which represents the authentication
performance of PLA is determined by distributions of test
statistic. Thus, it is necessary to analyze the impact of key
indicators (e.g., mean and variance) for the distributions on
authentication performance. From this figure, it is demon-
strated that as the difference betweenµ0 andµ1 increases and
σ 20 decreases, the PLA scheme has an improved authentica-
tion performance. Here, the parameters of distributions (i.e.,
µ0, µ1, σ 20 , and σ
2
1 ) depend on not only which PLA scheme
we use but also communication environment (e.g., SNR).
FIGURE 7. λ for different target false alarm probabilities, where
P◦M = 10
−5, ρ = 0.5, µ0 = 0, and σ20 = σ
2
1 = 0.1.
So, it is difficult for PLA to guarantee good authentication
performance under poor communication environment.
In Fig. 7, we show the relationship between λ and P◦F
in the proposed protocol, where P◦M = 10
−5, ρ = 0.5,
µ0 = 0, and σ 20 = σ
2
1 = 0.1. First, as seen in the figure, for
a fixed target false alarm probability, the target false alarm
probability, P◦F , is inversely proportional to λ. That is, high
target miss and false alarm probabilities make the distance
between two thresholds (i.e., α0 and α1) narrow. As a result,
the probability of ‘Ambiguous’ becomes low because the
distance is the range of ‘Ambiguous’ (from (3)). In addition,
it is favorable to have a large |µ1−µ0| because the probability
density functions of η|Hi are distant from each other with
a large |µ1 − µ0|. This implies that if the authentication
performance of the PLA is improved, signaling overhead can
be reduced in the proposed protocol with a low λ.
Fig. 8 shows the simulation results for the signaling
and communication overheads over various numbers of IoT
devices to compare the proposed protocol to conventional
AKA and cross-layer authentication protocols [34], where
P = 20, U = 20, L = V = 64, and λ = 10−5.
In these simulations, total overhead and overhead at the
MME were considered. The overhead at the MME is the
overhead of messages exchanged at the MME. As shown in
the figure, the proposed protocol demonstrates small total
signaling and communication overheads compared to the
conventional EPS-AKA and cross-layer authentication proto-
col [34]. In addition, the proposed protocol without a shared
PHY secret key shows slightly improved performance com-
pared to the proposed protocol with a shared PHY secret key
in terms of signaling and communication overheads due to
the simple procedures of PLA without a shared PHY secret
key. Furthermore, while the signaling overhead at theMME is
the same as the total signaling overhead in the conventional
protocols, in the proposed protocol, the signaling overhead
at the MME is significantly less than the total signaling
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TABLE 3. Computation time of AKA protocols.
FIGURE 8. Overhead over various numbers of IoT devices, where P = 20,
U = 20, L = V = 64, and λ = 10−5.
overhead because, in the proposed protocol, the BS performs
preemptive authentication (i.e., PLA) rather than the MME.
In Fig. 9, the signaling and communication overheads are
plotted for different target false alarm probabilities to demon-
strate the relationship between authentication performance




−5,P = 20,U = 20, L = 64, andN = 200. As seen
the figures, as a false alarm probability increases, signaling
and communication overheads slightly decrease due to the
FIGURE 9. Overhead over various target false alarm probabilities, where
µ0 = 0, σ20 = σ
2
1 = 0.1, P
◦
M = 10
−5, P = 20, U = 20, L = V = 64, and
N = 200.
inverse proportional relationship between and P◦F and λ (In
details, please see Fig. 7). It means that there is a trade-off
between authentication performance and signaling overhead.
For example, if we set threshold values, i.e., α0 and α1, which
make target miss and false alarm probabilities low to enhance
the security, the proposed protocol will requiremore overhead
with a large λ. Fortunately, however, although a false alarm
probability is very low (e.g., P◦F = 10
−10), the proposed
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FIGURE 10. Signaling overhead and computation time to compare the
proposed protocol to the conventional AKA protocols [9], [11], [14], where
µ0 = 0, µ1 = 2.5, σ20 = σ
2
1 = 0.1, P
◦
M = 10
−5, P◦F = 10
−10, P = 20, U = 20,
L = V = 64, and C = 5.
protocol maintains small signaling and communication over-
heads compared to the conventional EPS-AKA. Furthermore,
the proposed protocol can improve the performances with a
large difference of distributions (i.e., |µ1 − µ0|) in terms of
signaling and communication overheads. That is, if a PLA
scheme which provides a good authentication performance is
used in the proposed protocol, signaling and communication
overhead can be reduced with fixed target miss and false
alarm probabilities.
Fig. 10 shows the simulation results for signaling over-
head and computation time to compare the proposed protocol
to the conventional AKA protocols [9], [11], [14], where
µ0 = 0, µ1 = 2.5, σ 20 = σ
2





−10, P = 20, U = 20, L = V = 64, and C = 5.
As shown in the Fig. 10 (a), the proposed protocol outper-
forms conventional lightweight AKA protocols [9], [11], [14]
in terms of signaling overhead. In addition, if the proposed
protocol is designed by applying PLA to the lightweight
AKA protocols, the signaling overhead is expected to be
further reduced. Meanwhile, from (20), the computational
complexity is inversely proportional to authentication per-
formance (i.e., miss and false alarm probabilities) due
to the proportional relationship between λ and computa-
tion time. However, as seen in Fig. 10 (b), the proposed
protocol outperforms conventional lightweight AKA proto-
cols in terms of computation time under the sufficiently low
false alarm probability (i.e., P◦F = 10
−10). It means that the
proposed protocol is suitable for the authentication of IoT
devices which have limited hardware resources.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have proposed a cross-layer authentica-
tion protocol to reduce signaling overhead in massive IoT
systems. By exploiting the notion of local security, PLA is
employed as preemptive authentication between IoT devices
and a BS. Based on our integration strategy, cryptography-
based authentication is performed selectively using the pre-
emptive PLA result to reduce signaling overhead. The pro-
posed protocol is divided into two cases, without and with
an additional secret key. We analyzed the signaling and
communication overheads of the proposed methods for a
target authentication performance. Meanwhile, a required
authentication performance of a PLA scheme is derived for
target authentication and overhead performances. Through
theoretical analysis and numerical simulations, we have
demonstrated that the proposed protocol incurs less overhead
and has smaller computational complexity than conventional
AKA protocols while maintaining competitive authentication
performance.
There are several avenues in which to explore this research
further. First, it is worth discussing how to find optimal
thresholds which maximize a trade-off between authenti-
cation performance and overhead in the proposed proto-
col. In addition, PLA that employs multiple physical features
should be considered to improve authentication performance
of the proposed protocol in future.
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